

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN CHINA

“Let China sleep. For when China wakes, it will shake the world.”

Napoleon Bonaparte

Ancient China was arguably one of the strongest, richest empires in existence – so much so that her rulers saw little value in contacting anyone else in the world. Even though China’s power was much diminished by the era of Napoleon, his words describing China as a sleeping giant prophesied the China of the early 21st century – a great civilization on the rise again.

Since western countries first began exploring the world several centuries ago, they have tended to either ignore or exploit China in world politics. And yet the presence of China is deeply felt, sometimes promising riches and cooperation, and other times threatening competition and destruction. Today China stands as one of the few remaining communist nations, with no signs of renouncing communism. China is by some standards a less developed country, but on the other hand the country is emerging as a major world power, partly because of recent dramatic improvements in GNP and standards of living. China no longer sleeps. Its leaders now claim membership in the World Trade Organization, travel frequently to other countries, and take active part in the United Nations. The world now comes to China for its vast array of products, and more and more, China is going outside its borders for investments, labor supplies, and raw materials. Its steady move toward capitalism has led some to argue that democratization will follow, yet the government remains highly authoritarian, providing evidence that marketization and privatization do not always go hand in hand with democracy.

SOVEREIGNTY, AUTHORITY, AND POWER

Until the 20th century China’s history was characterized by **dynastic cycles** – long periods of rule by a family punctuated by times of “chaos”, when the family lost its power and was challenged by a new, and ultimately successful, ruling dynasty. Power was determined by the **mandate of heaven**, or the right to rule as seen by the collective ancestral wisdom that guided the empire from the heavens above. For many centuries public authority rested in the hands of the emperor and an elaborate bureaucracy that exercised this highly centralized power. After a time of chaos in the early 20th century, Communist leader Mao Zedong took over China in 1949, bringing in a new regime whose values often disagreed with traditional concepts of power. How different is the new China from the old? Have the changes brought instability, or have they successfully transformed the country into a modern world power?

China’s political structures reflect many modern influences, but the weight of tradition has shaped them in unique ways. For example, China is technically governed by a constitution that grants formal authority to both party and state executive and legislative offices. However, the country is still governed by authoritarian elite that are not bound by rule of law. As long as the rulers are above the law, the constitution will not be a major source of legitimacy for the state.

LEGITIMACY

Under dynastic rule, Chinese citizens were subjects of the emperor. Legitimacy was established through the mandate of heaven, and power passed from one emperor to the next through hereditary connections within the ruling family. As long as things went well, the emperor’s authority was generally accepted, but when problems occurred and the dynasty weakened, rival families challenged the throne, claiming that the em-

peror had lost the mandate. Legitimacy was not for peasants to determine, although popular rebellions and unrest in the countryside served as signs that the emperor was failing.

The Revolution of 1911 gave birth to the Chinese Republic, with western-educated **Sun Yat-sen** as its first president. The new regime was supposed to be democratic, with legitimacy resting on popular government. However, regional warlords challenged the government, much as they always had done in times of political chaos. Emerging from the mayhem was **Mao Zedong**, with his own version of authority, an ideology known as **Maoism**. The **People's Republic of China** was established in 1949, and Mao led the **Chinese Communist Party** as the new source of power until his death in 1976.

Inspired by Marxism, **Maoism** was idealistic and egalitarian, and even though it endorsed centralized power exercised through the top leaders of the party, it stressed the importance of staying connected to the peasants through a process called mass line. Mass line required leaders to listen to and communicate with ordinary folks, and without it, the legitimacy of the rulers was questionable. Despite this important difference between Maoism and Leninism (which based its authority on the urban proletariat), the organizing principle for both ideologies was democratic centralism. Democratic centralism allowed leaders to make decisions in the name of the people, and gave both Lenin and Mao almost complete control over policymaking power.

Since Mao's death, the Politburo of the Communist Party remains the legitimate source of power in China, but the leadership has come under a great deal of criticism in recent years. The Party is said to be corrupt and irrelevant, holding authoritarian power over an increasingly market-based economy. In truth, rebellions against the party have flared up throughout PRC history, but the rumblings have been louder and more frequent since the Tiananmen incident in 1989. How serious a threat these criticisms are to the current regime is a matter of some debate, and current Communist leaders show no signs of loosening the party's hold on the government and the economy.

One important source of power in the People's Republic of China has been the military. The military played an important role in the rise of the Communist Party, and it is represented in the government by the **Central Military Commission**. The head of this commission plays an important role in policymaking. For example, long-time leader Deng Xiaoping was never general secretary of the Communist Party, but he directed the Central Military Commission.

HISTORICAL TRADITIONS

Despite the fact that the last dynasty (the Qing) fell in the early 20th century, many traditions from the dynastic era influence the modern political system:

- **Authoritarian power** – China's borders have changed over time, but it has long been a huge, land-based empire ruled from a central place by either an emperor or a small group of people. Chinese citizens have traditionally been subjects of, not participants in, their political system. Despite the many dynastic rules in China's history, the ruling family was always subject to attack from regional warlords who challenged their right to the mandate of heaven. This tendency toward decentralization is apparent in the modern regime as a centralized politburo attempts to control its vast population and numerous policies and problems.
- **Confucianism** – This philosophy has shaped the Chinese political system since the 6th century B.C.E. It emphasized the importance of order and harmony, and encouraged Chinese citizens to submit to the emperor's power, and reinforced the emperor's responsibility to fulfill his duties conscientiously. This aspect of Confucianism may be tied to **democratic centralism**, or the communist belief in a small group of leaders who rule for the good of the people. Confucianism is still a major influence

on Chinese society today as it contradicts the egalitarian ideology of communism with its central belief in unequal relationships and mutual respect among people of different statuses, especially within families.

- **Bureaucratic hierarchy based on scholarship** – The emperors surrounded themselves with highly organized bureaucracies that formed an elite based on Confucian scholarship. Government jobs were highly coveted and extremely competitive, with only a small percentage of candidates mastering the examination system. The exams were knowledge-based, and bureaucrats had to be well-versed in Confucianism and many related philosophies. A major social separation in Ancient China was between a large peasant population and the bureaucratic elite.
- **The “Middle Kingdom”** – Since ancient times, Chinese have referred to their country as **zhongguo**, meaning “Middle Kingdom”, or the place that is the center of civilization. Foreigners were seen as “barbarians” whose civilizations are far inferior to China’s, not just in terms of power, but also in terms of ethics and quality of life. All countries are ethnocentric in their approaches to other countries, but China almost always assumed that no one else had much to offer them. After the empire’s 19th-century weakness was exploited by the imperialist powers, these traditional assumptions were challenged, but not destroyed.
- **Communist ideologies** – The 20th century brought the new influence of Maoism that emphasized the “right thinking” and moralism of Confucianism, but contradicted the hierarchical nature of the old regime with its insistence on egalitarianism. The late 20th century brought **Deng Xiaoping Theory**, a practical mix of authoritarian political control and economic privatization.

POLITICAL CULTURE

China’s political culture is multi-dimensional and deep, shaped by geographical features and by the many eras of its history: dynastic rule, control by imperialist nations and its aftermath, and communist rule.

CONFUCIANISM AND MAOISM

CONFUCIANISM

Mandate of heaven
(responsibility of ruler to the people)

Vision of an ideal society based on
harmony and obedience

Hierarchical social and political
organization; rulers and subjects
have unequal positions

Emphasis on loyalty to family

MAOISM

Democratic centralism
(responsibility of ruler to the people)

Vision of ideal society based on
self reliance and struggle

Egalitarian social structure;
mass line between rulers and subjects


Emphasis on loyalty to the state, Mao

GEOGRAPHIC INFLUENCES

Today China has the largest population of any country on earth, and its land surface is the third largest, after Russia and Canada. Some of its important geographical features include

- Access to oceans/ice free ports
- Many large navigable rivers
- Major geographical/climate splits between north and south
- Geographic isolation of the western part of the country
- Mountain ranges, deserts, and oceans that separate China from other countries

These geographic features have shaped Chinese political development for centuries. China's location in the world and protective mountain ranges allowed the Chinese to ignore the rest of the world whenever they wanted to until the 19th century. The rugged terrain of the western part of the country has limited population growth there. The large navigable rivers and good harbors of the east have attracted population, so that the overwhelming majority of people in China have lived in these areas for centuries. Differences in climate and terrain have also created a cultural split between the north and the south.



Population concentrations in China. The vast majority of the population live in urban areas in the east, with many cities located along rivers and in coastal areas. Large stretches of mountains and deserts make the western and northern parts of the country less habitable.

HISTORICAL ERAS

1. **Dynastic rule** – The political culture inherited from centuries of dynastic rule centers on **Confucian values**, such as order, harmony, and a strong sense of hierarchy – “superior” and “subservient” positions. China has traditionally valued scholarship as a way to establish superiority, with mandarin scholars filling bureaucratic positions in the government. China’s early relative isolation from other countries contributes to a strong sense of cultural identity. Related to Chinese identity is a high degree of ethnocentrism – the sense that China is central to humanity (the “middle kingdom”) and superior to other cultures. Centuries of expansion and invasion have brought many other Asian people under Chinese control, resulting in long-standing tensions between “Han” Chinese and others groups. A modern example is Tibet, where a strong sense of Tibetan ethnicity has created resistance to Chinese control.
2. **Resistance to imperialism** – During the 19th century China’s strong sense of cultural identity blossomed into nationalism as it resisted persistent attempts by imperialist nations – such as England, France, Germany, and Japan – to exploit China’s natural resources and people. This nationalism was secured by the Revolution of 1911, and the hatred of the “**foreign devils**” has led China to be cautious and suspicious in her dealings with capitalist countries ever since.
3. **Maoism** – Mao Zedong was strongly influenced by Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin, but his version of communism is distinctly suited to China. Whereas Lenin emphasized the importance of a party vanguard to lead the people to revolution and beyond, Mao resisted the inequality implied by Lenin’s beliefs. He believed in the strength of the peasant, and centered his philosophy on these central values:
 - **Collectivism** – valuing the good of the community above that of the individual. This belief suited the peasant-based communities that have existed throughout Chinese history, and it contrasts to the beliefs of scholars (valued by the old culture) who have often been drawn to individualism.
 - **Struggle and activism** – Mao encouraged the people to actively pursue the values of socialism, something he understood would require struggle and devotion.
 - **Mass line** – Mao conceptualized a line of communication between party leaders, members, and peasants that would allow all to struggle toward realization of the goals of a communist state. The mass line involved teaching and listening on everyone’s part. Leaders would communicate their will and direction to the people, but the people in turn would communicate through the mass line their wisdoms to the leaders.
 - **Egalitarianism** – Hierarchy was the key organizing principle in Chinese society before 1949, and Mao’s emphasis on creating an egalitarian society was in complete opposition to it.
 - **Self-reliance** – Instead of relying on the elite to give directions, people under Maoist rule were encouraged to rely on their own talents to contribute to their communities.
4. **Deng Xiaoping Theory** – “It doesn’t matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice.” This famous 1962 statement by Deng reflects his practical approach to solving China’s problems. In other words, he didn’t worry too much about whether a policy was capitalist or socialist as long as it improved the economy. The result of his leadership (1978-1997) was a dramatic turnaround of the Chinese economy through a combination of socialist planning and the capitalist free

market. His political and social views, however, remained true to Communist tradition – the party should supervise all, and no allowances should be made for individual freedoms and/or democracy.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS

Especially among the political elite, power and respect depend not so much on official positions as on who has what connections to whom. During the days of the early PRC, these ties were largely based on reputations established during the **Long March**, a 1934-1936 cross-country trek led by Mao Zedong as Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist army pursued his communist followers. Today those leaders are dead, but **factions** of their followers still compete for power, and informal relationships define each change in leadership. This informal network – a version of a **patron-client system** – is not apparent to the casual outside observer. As a result, whenever new leaders come to power, such as the 2003 transition, it isn't easy to predict how policy-making will be affected. However, an important principle is to study their relationships with past leaders. For example, it is significant that Hu Yaobang, a reformer whose death was mourned by the students that led the Tiananmen Square protest in 1989, mentored Hu Jintao, the current general secretary of the CCP. Also important is the fact that, before he died, Deng Xiaoping designated Hu Jintao as his "4th generation" successor.

CHINESE NATIONALISM

The identity of Han Chinese – the predominant ethnic group in China – goes back to ancient times. The Han referred to their land as the "Middle Kingdom," or the culture at the center of all others. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Chinese nationalists fought hard against the western imperialists that dominated China, and they eventually won their country's independence. This pride in Chinese culture and accomplishments is apparent in China today, especially in recent years by sensitivity to Westerners who have often reacted to it as a third world country. Whereas Mao encouraged his people to ignore the outside world and concentrate on growing the country from within, China has become increasingly involved in world politics and trade since the early days of Deng Xiaoping's rule.

The 2008 Olympics were intended to showcase China's growing place in the world, and many Chinese people reacted strongly to the protests that erupted in some western cities as the Olympic torch passed through on its way to Beijing. Chinese nationalists used the internet to express their anger toward pro-Tibetan western press coverage of the unrest in Tibet. Tibetans and other minority groups are seen as inferior people by some strong nationalists, and their pride in being Han Chinese is often apparent. Another indication that Chinese nationalism is on the rise is the reaction that some have had to the global economic crisis of late 2008. As the West has suffered, many have predicted the demise of the United States, a situation which Chinese nationalists have seen as an opportunity to reassert the new global ascendancy of the Middle Kingdom. At the G-20 meeting of the 20 largest national economies in April 2009, Chinese nationalists saw significance in the fact that President Hu Jintao stood to the right of host Gordon Brown (Britain) in the front center of the official photograph of the leaders gathered for the summit. Others proclaimed that the G-20 meeting was irrelevant, and the only significant summit was the "G-2" meeting between Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao. As China's economic star has risen in recent years, it has been supported by a large dose of traditional pride in the glory of one of the world's oldest civilization as it reclaims what is believed to be its rightful position in the world.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE

Like Russia, China is an old civilization with a long, relatively stable history that experienced massive upheavals during the 20th century that resulted in regime changes. Unlike Russia, however, China rose to regional **hegemony** (control of surrounding countries) very early in its history and has ranked as one of the

most influential political systems in the world for many centuries. Russia's history as a great power is much shorter than China's.

Until the 19th century dynastic cycles explained the patterns of political and economic change in China. A dynasty would seize power, grow stronger, and then decline. During its decline, other families would challenge the dynasty, and a new one would emerge as a sign that it had the mandate of heaven. This cycle was interrupted by the Mongols in the 13th century, when their leaders conquered China and ruled until the mandate was recaptured by the Ming who restored Han Chinese control. The Manchu were also a conquering people from the north, who established the Qing (or "pure") dynasty in the 17th century. This last dynasty toppled under European pressure in the early 20th century.

Change during the first half of the 20th century was radical, violent, and chaotic, and the result was a very different type of regime: communism. Did European intrusions and revolutions of the 20th century break the Chinese dynastic cycles forever? Or is this just another era of chaos between dynasties? It is hard to imagine that dynastic families might reappear in the 21st century or beyond, but Chinese political traditions are strong, and they almost certainly will determine what happens next in Chinese political development.

CHANGE BEFORE 1949

China's oldest cultural and political traditions have long provided stability and longevity for the empire/country. These traditions come from the dynastic rule that lasted for many centuries. However, in recent years two disruptive influences – control by imperialistic nations (19th century) and revolutionary upheavals (20th century) have threatened that stability and provide challenges to modern China.


CONTROL BY IMPERIALISTIC NATIONS

During the 19th century, the weakened Qing Dynasty fell prey to imperialistic nations – such as England, Germany, France, and Japan – who carved China into "**spheres of influence**" for their own economic gain. This era left many Chinese resentful of the "**foreign devils**" that they eventually rebelled against.

REVOLUTIONARY UPHEAVALS

Major revolutions occurred in China in 1911 and 1949, with many chaotic times in between. Three themes dominated this revolutionary era:

- **Nationalism** – The Chinese wished to recapture strength and power from the imperialistic nations that dominated them during the 19th century. The Revolution of 1911 – led by Sun Yat-sen – was a successful attempt to reestablish China as an independent country.
- **Establishing a new political community** – With the dynasties gone and the imperialists run out, what kind of government would modern China adopt? One answer came from **Chiang Kai-shek**, who founded the **Nationalist Party (Guomindang)** and the other from **Mao Zedong**, the founder of the Chinese Communist Party.
- **Socioeconomic development** – A major challenge of the 20th century has been the reestablishment of a strong economic and social fabric after the years of imperialistic control. During the 1920s, the newly formed Soviet Union served as a model for policymaking, but the Nationalists broke with them in 1928. Chiang Kai-shek became the president of China, and Mao Zedong and his communists were left an outlaw party.



MARKER EVENT: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS

The important philosophical influence of Confucianism throughout China's long history encouraged a hierarchical society that assumed inequalities as basic to an orderly society with men and women playing very traditional, family-based roles. As the revolutionary spirit erupted in China during the early 20th century, women's rights became an important issue, resulting in a ban on foot binding and an increase in educational and career opportunities for women. When Mao Zedong instituted the egalitarian values of communism in China, one effect was to create more equal roles for men and women. Mao was committed to women's equality because, in his words, "women hold up half of the heavens."

Even before Mao's Communist Party took over the country, women actively advanced the revolutionary cause by serving as teachers, nurses, spies, laborers, and occasionally as soldiers on the front line. Mao's commitment to women's rights extended to his personal life as well, with his wife, Jiang Qing, playing an increasingly prominent role as an adviser and eventually implementer of his policies. Despite these changes, after Mao's death traditional values remained, with foot binding still practiced among some elites. However, the expectation that women work outside the home continued, and opportunities for educational and professional careers have remained open to women.

THE LEGEND OF THE LONG MARCH

Strength for Mao's Communist Party was gained by the Long March – the 1934-36 pursuit of Mao's army across China by Chiang and his supporters. Chiang was trying to depose his rival, but his attempt to find and conquer Mao had the opposite effect. Mao eluded him until finally Chiang had to turn his attentions to the invading Japanese. Mao emerged as a hero of the people, and many of his loyal friends on the March lived to be prominent leaders of the People's Republic of China after its founding in 1949.

THE FOUNDING OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA – 1949-1966

The Japanese occupied China during World War II, but after the war ended, the forces of Chiang and Mao met in civil war, and Mao prevailed. In 1949 Chiang fled to Taiwan, and Mao established the People's Republic of China under communist rule.

The People's Republic of China was born from a civil war between the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists under Mao Zedong. After many years of competitive struggle, Mao's army forced Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters off the mainland to the island of Taiwan (Formosa). Mao named his new China the "People's Republic of China," and Chiang claimed that his headquarters in Taiwan formed the true government. The "Two Chinas", then, were created, and the PRC was not to be recognized as a nation by the United Nations until 1972. The PRC, like the Soviet Union, was based on the organizing principle of democratic centralism.

The early political development of the PRC proceeded in two phases:

1) **The Soviet model** (1949-1957) – The Soviet Union had been supporting Mao's efforts since the 1920s, and with his victory in 1949, it began pouring money and expertise into the PRC. With this help, Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) quickly turned their attention to some of the country's most glaring social problems.

- **Land reform** – This campaign redistributed property from the rich to the poor and increased productivity in the countryside.
- **Civil reform** – They set about to free people from opium addiction, and they greatly enhanced women's legal rights. For example, they allowed women to free themselves from unhappy arranged marriages. These measures helped to legitimize Mao's government in the eyes of the people.
- **Five-Year Plans** – Between 1953 and 1957, the CCP launched the first of its Soviet-style Five-Year Plans to nationalize industry and collectivize agriculture, implementing steps toward socialism.

2) **The Great Leap Forward** (1958-1966) – Mao changed directions in 1958, partly in an effort to free China from Soviet domination. The spirit of nationalism is a force behind Mao's policy here, and he was still unhappy with the degree of inequality in Chinese society. The Great Leap Forward was a utopian effort to transform China into a radical egalitarian society. Its emphasis was mainly economic, and it was based on four principles:

- **All-around development** – not just heavy industry (as under Stalin in the USSR), but almost equal emphasis to agriculture.
- **Mass mobilization** – an effort to turn the sheer numbers of the population into an asset - better motivation, harder work, less unemployment.
- **Political unanimity and zeal** – an emphasis on party workers running government, not bureaucrats. **Cadres** – party workers at the lowest levels - were expected to demonstrate their party devotion by spurring the people on to work as hard as they could.
- **Decentralization** – encouraged more government on the local level, less central control. The people can do it!

The Great Leap Forward did not live up to its name. Mao's efforts ran counter to the traditional political culture (bureaucratic centralism), and the people lacked skills to contribute to industrialization. Some bad harvests conjured up fears of the loss of the mandate of heaven.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION – 1966-1976

Between 1960 and 1966, Mao allowed two of his faithful – Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping – to implement market-oriented policies that revived the economy, but Mao was still unhappy with China's progress toward true egalitarianism. And so he instituted the Cultural Revolution – a much more profound reform in that it encompassed political and social change, as well as economic. His main goal was to purify the party and the country through radical transformation. Important principles were:

- **the ethic of struggle**
- **mass line**
- **collectivism**
- **egalitarianism**
- **unstinting service to society** (see p. 151)

A primary goal of the Cultural Revolution was to remove all vestiges of the old China and its hierarchical bureaucracy and emphasis on inequality. Scholars were sent into the fields to work, and universities and libraries were destroyed. Emphasis was put on elementary education – all people should be able to read and write – but any education that created inequality was targeted for destruction.

Mao died in 1976, leaving his followers divided into factions:

- **Radicals** – led by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, one of the “Gang of Four,” who supported the radical goals of the Cultural Revolution.
- **Military** – always a powerful group because of the long-lasting 20th century struggles that required an army, the military was led by Lin Biao, who died in a mysterious airplane crash in 1971.
- **Moderates** – led by Zhou Enlai, who emphasized economic modernization and limited contact with other countries, including the United States. Zhou influenced Mao to invite President Richard Nixon to China in 1972. He died only a few months after Mao.

Members of these factions were not only tied to one another through common purposes, but also through personal relationships, illustrating the importance of informal politics throughout Chinese history.

DENG XIAOPING’S MODERNIZATIONS (1978-1997)

The Gang of Four was arrested by the new CCP leader, Hua Guofeng, whose actions helped the moderates take control. Zhou’s death opened the path for leadership from the moderate faction. By 1978, the new leader emerged – Deng Xiaoping. His vision drastically altered China’s direction through “**Four Modernizations**” invented by Zhou Enlai before his death – **industry, agriculture, science, and the military**. These modernizations have been at the heart of the country’s official policy ever since. Under Deng’s leadership, then, China experienced economic liberalization, and these policies have helped to implement the new direction:

- “**Open door**” trade policy – trade with everyone, including capitalist nations like the U.S. that will boost China’s economy.
- **Reforms in education** – higher academic standards, expansion of higher education and research (a reversal of the policy during the Cultural Revolution).
- **Institutionalization of the Revolution** – restoring the legal system and bureaucracy of the Old China, decentralizing the government, modifying elections, and infusing capitalism.

Despite the major reforms that Deng Xiaoping instituted, he did not support political liberalization, and China has followed this path ever since.

CITIZENS, SOCIETY AND THE STATE

As leadership of the country has passed from Mao to Deng to Jiang Zemin and then Hu Jintao, the relationship of Chinese citizens to the state has changed profoundly. Under Maoism, virtually no civil society was allowed, and the government controlled almost every facet of citizens’ lives. With a transition to a market-based economy, important transformations are occurring in citizen-state relationships.

Party leaders realize that most citizens no longer see communist ideology as central to their lives. As a result, the Chinese Communist Party now appeals to patriotism and the traditional pride in being Chinese. The message is that China's economic resurgence in recent years is a reemergence of the great ancient Chinese Empire, but now under communist leadership. For example, the party-state does all it can to tout its leading role in China's economic achievements, winning the 2008 Summer Olympics for Beijing, and returning Hong Kong to Chinese control.

ETHNIC CLEAVAGES

China's ethnic population is primarily **Han Chinese**, the people that historically formed the basis of China's identity, first as an empire, and eventually as a country. China's borders have long included other ethnicities, primarily through conquest and expansion of land claims in Asia. Minority groups now comprise only about eight percent of the PRC's population, but their "autonomous areas" (such as Tibet and Xinjiang) make up more than 60% of China's territory and have a long history of resistance to the Chinese government. There are 55 officially recognized minority groups, and no one minority is very large. Even so, the Chinese government has put a great deal of time and effort into its policies regarding ethnic groups.

Most minorities live on or near China's borders with other countries, and most of their areas are sparsely populated. For example, Mongols live in both Mongolia and China, and Kazakhs live in both the Kazakh Republic and China. Because dissidents are a long way from areas of dense population, China is worried that they may encourage independence, or join with neighboring countries.

Even though the percentages are not high, China does have about 100 million citizens who are members of minorities groups, a huge number by anyone's calculations. By and large, the government's policy has been to encourage economic development and suppress expressions of dissent in ethnic minority areas. Most of China's minorities are in the five **autonomous regions** of Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. The Chinese constitution grants autonomous areas the right of self-government in some matters, such as cultural affairs, but their autonomy is in fact very limited. Ethnic dissent continues to the present, although many groups appear to be content to be part of the Chinese empire.

Tibet – with its long history of separate ethnic identity – has been especially problematic since the Chinese army conquered it in the early days of the PRC. The former government of Tibet never recognized Chinese authority, and many Tibetans today campaign for independence. The movement rallies around the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader who fled to India in 1959 after Tibet's failed uprising against China. A series of riots and demonstrations took place in Tibet in March of 2008 on the 49th anniversary of the failed uprising, a situation that increased tensions between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan cause was highlighted in 2008 by protests that greeted the Olympic torch in some Western cities, as the runners made their way to Beijing, where the Olympics were held.

A second group of people that have shown increasing unrest are the Uyghurs, who are Muslims of Turkish descent living in Xinjiang, very close to the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union. Uyghur militants want to create a separate Islamic state and have sometimes used violence to support their cause. In the post-September 11 world, the Chinese have become very concerned with these Muslim dissidents. Their fears were confirmed in July 2009 when riots broke out in Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang. The riots were sparked by Uyghur dissatisfaction with the Chinese central government's handling of the deaths of two Uyghur workers during previous disruptions, but the violence was part of the ongoing ethnic tensions between the Han and the Uyghurs.

Even among the Han Chinese there is great linguistic diversity, although they have shared a written language for many centuries. Since its inception the Communist regime has tried to make Mandarin the official language of government and education. For example, in early 2006 China stepped up its repression of Shanghainese (or Cantonese), a language which, in its various forms, is native to close to 100 million people, especially around Shanghai, China's largest city. Rules required most people in the public sector, including teachers and members of the broadcast media, to use Mandarin when addressing the public. In 2008, the education minister of Hong Kong lifted restrictions that forced many secondary schools to teach in Cantonese, reversing a policy adopted shortly after Hong Kong's reversion to China in 1997. One motivation was probably the results of a study that showed that students from English-speaking schools did far better in getting into universities than did those from Cantonese-speaking schools. Despite restrictions such as this, dialects remain embedded in Chinese society, and demonstrate the difficulty that the centralized state has in imposing its will on its huge territorial space.

URBAN-RURAL CLEAVAGES

An increasingly important divide in Chinese society is between rural and urban areas. Most of China's tremendous economic growth over the past few decades has taken place in cities. As a result, the gap between urban and rural incomes has grown to the point that some observers have redefined the meaning of "two Chinas" – this time, a rural and an urban one. The divide is not just economic, but also includes social life style differences that form the basis of growing resentments across the countryside. One result has been an upsurge in protests in rural areas, where some believe that the government is not looking out for their interests. For example, a few years ago in Hunan Province, thousands of angry farmers marched on the township government headquarters to protest excessive taxes and corruption of local officials. Shortly afterward, nine people suspected of being leaders of the protests were arrested. In reaction to this discontent, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced in 2006 a new government emphasis on "**a new socialist countryside,**" a program to lift the lagging rural economy. He recognized the following year that the rural poor had an array of problems not shared by urban residents.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

According to Chinese tradition before 1949, citizens are subjects of government, not participants in a political system. The communist state redefined political participation by creating a relationship between the Communist Party and citizenship, and by shaping the economic relationship between citizens and the government. Nevertheless, old traditions that governed personal ties and relationships still mold China's political processes, and influence the actions and beliefs of elites and citizens alike. In recent years popular social movements that support democracy, religious beliefs, and community ties over nationalism have influenced Chinese politics and helped to define China's relationships with other countries.

PARTY AND PARTICIPATION

The **Chinese Communist Party (CCP)** is the largest political party in the world in terms of total formal membership, with about 58 million members at the turn of the century. However, as was true in the USSR, its members make up only a small minority of the country's population. Only about 8% of those over eighteen (the minimum age for joining the party) are members of the CCP. Only those that are judged to be fully committed to the ideals of communism and who are willing to devote a great deal of time and energy to party affairs may join. Party membership is growing, with new members recruited largely from the CCP's **Youth League**. Almost 70 million Chinese youths belonged to the Youth League by 2005.

The economic reforms begun by Deng Xiaoping paved the way for a milestone transition in the backgrounds of party members. During the Maoist era (before 1976) revolutionary **cadres** whose careers depended on

party loyalty and ideological purity led the CCP at all levels. Most cadres were peasants or factory workers, and few were intellectuals or professionals. Since Deng's reforms, "**technocrats**," people with technical training who have climbed the ladder of the party bureaucracy, have led the party increasingly. All seven members of the current Standing Committee have academic and professional backgrounds in technical fields, and five of them were trained as engineers. Today less than 40 percent of party members come from the peasantry, although peasants still make up the largest single group within the CCP. The fastest growing membership category consists of officials, intellectuals, technicians, and other professionals. Women make up about 20 percent of the membership and only about 4 percent of the Central Committee.

A significant change in party membership came in 2001 with the decision to allow capitalists to become members. In a repudiation of Maoist principles, President Jiang Zemin argued that the CCP ought to represent not just workers and peasants but business interests as well. According to some estimates, between a quarter and a third of all Chinese entrepreneurs are CCP members, a fact that significantly alters the traditional concept of "cadre."

THE GROWTH OF CIVIL SOCIETY

In recent years the control mechanisms of the party have loosened as new forms of associations appear, like Western-style discos and coffeehouses. Communications through cell phones, fax machines, TV satellite dishes, and internet have made it more difficult for the party-state to monitor citizens.

An important new development is the growth of civil society – the appearance of private organizations that do not directly challenge the authority of the state but focus on social problems, such as the environment, AIDS, and legal reform. For example, recently activist organizations have protested government-sponsored dam projects that would flood the farmland of millions of peasants. The government is trying to harness waterpower for further industrial development, and even though the protesters will probably not block the projects, the very existence of these groups represents a major change. Hu Jintao has announced a policy of "harmonious development" that allows the state to solicit public opinion before expanding the country's infrastructure or sponsoring economic development. However, citizens still complain that the government lacks transparency because it reveals its plans too late and in very obscure places. Such attitudes sparked demonstrations in early 2008 in Shanghai when the government extended its train lines without notifying people whose property would be affected by the project. Many observers believe that the rising middle class in China is awakening to the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship.

Activists had virtually no say in the Chinese political system until the 1990s when Beijing allowed **non-governmental organizations (NGOs)** to register with the government. Today China has thousands of NGOs, ranging from ping-pong clubs to environmentalist groups. A key test of China's tolerance is religion. Today Christianity and Buddhism are rebounding, after years of communist suppression of religion. Despite these changes, the government still keeps close control of these groups, with their 1999-2001 crackdown on the religious movement Falon Gong a good example of the party's limited tolerance of activities outside the political realm.

PROTESTS

The Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 showed the limits of protest in China. Massive repression was the government's message to its citizens that democratic movements that defy the party leadership will not be tolerated. In recent years, religious groups, such as Falon Gong, have staged major protests, but none have risen to the level of conflict apparent in 1989. Village protests have made their way into the news, and thousands of labor strikes have been reported. Some observers believe that protests will pose serious threats to the party in the near future.

Riots in Tibet and Protests to the Torch Relay

In recent years the most serious protest movements have occurred in Tibet and Xinjiang, both autonomous regions in western China. In Tibet, a series of riots and demonstrations took place in Lhasa, Tibet's capital city, on March of 2008 on the 49th anniversary of the failed uprisings against China in 1959. The protests became violent after 300 Buddhist monks demanded the release of other monks who had been detained for several months. More political demands followed, as Tibetans and non-Tibetan ethnic groups quarreled, and rioting, looting, burning, and killing began. China's Premier Wen Jiabao accused the Dalai Lama of orchestrating the uprisings, a charge that the Dalai Lama denied, and tensions mounted between the two men. Riots followed in other provinces with Tibetan populations, and became serious enough that they drew international attention.

One series of reactions to the Tibetan riots occurred along the route of the 2008 Summer Olympics torch relay, called by the organizers a "Journey of Harmony" that was supposed to showcase the Olympics as China's symbolic connections to the rest of the world. In many cities along the route, the torch relay was met by protesters inspired most directly by the Tibetan riots, but who also objected to China's human rights record, the political status of Taiwan, and trade policies with Darfur, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe. The protests were particularly strong in Paris, where Chinese security officials were forced to extinguish the flame. Large-scale counter-protests were held by overseas Chinese nationals, and in some places (San Francisco, Australia, Japan, and South Korea) the number of counter-protesters was higher than the number of protesters. Despite the chaos, the Olympics went on as planned without further major disruptions.

Riots in Xinjiang

In July 2000 riots broke out in Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang, in northwest China. The riots were sparked by Uyghur dissatisfaction with the Chinese central government's handling of the deaths of two Uyghur workers during previous disruptions. Protesters clashed with police, and after three days of rioting, President Hu Jintao left the G-8 summit to return to China to give his full attention to the violence. The



Western Riots in 2008 and 2009. Two serious riots broke out in the far western region of China in recent times. In 2008 rioting took place in Lhasa, the capital city of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, and in 2009 protests turned violent in Urumqi, the capital city of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. Both areas have heavy concentrations of ethnic minorities, and had a great deal of ethnic unrest that preceded the riot.

police tried to stop the rioters with tear gas, water hoses, roadblocks, and armored vehicles, and the government strictly enforced curfews in most urban areas. Internet services were shut down and cell phone service was restricted. Although the number of casualties was disputed, **Xinhua**, China's official news media, reported that the death toll from the riots was 197, and hundreds more were hospitalized.

The Chinese government responded to riots in Tibet and Xinjiang with large numbers of arrests, followed by court hearings. The head of the Communist Party in Xinjiang promised that those who have "committed crimes with cruel means" would be executed.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

China's political regime is best categorized as authoritarian, one in which decisions are made by political elites – those that hold political power – without much input from citizens. Leaders are recruited through their membership in the Communist Party, but personal relationships and informal ties to others are also important in deciding who controls the regime. However, this authoritarian regime has the same problem that emperors of past dynasties had – how to effectively govern the huge expanse of land and large population from one centralized place. As China has moved away from a command economy toward a market economy, this centralization has become even more problematic in recent years. As a result, a major feature of economic decision-making is now decentralization, or devolution of power to subnational governments. Local governments often defy or ignore the central government by setting their own tax rates or building projects without consulting the central government.

The political framework of the People's Republic of China is designed to penetrate as many corners of the country as possible through an elaborately organized Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As in the old Soviet Union, party personnel control government structures. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, the CCP also integrates its military into the political hierarchy. Political elites are often recruited from the military, and the head of the Central Military Commission is often the most powerful leader in China.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP)

Despite the many changes that China has experienced in recent years, the Chinese Communist Party is still at the heart of the political system. The party bases its claim to legitimacy not on the expressed will of the people but on representation of the historical best interests of all the people. Society is best led by an elite vanguard party with a superior understanding of the Chinese people and their needs (democratic centralism).

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CCP

The **Chinese Communist Party** (CCP) is organized hierarchically by levels – village/township, county, province, and nation. At the top of the system is the supreme leader (Deng Xiaoping's phrase was "the core"), who until 1976 was Chairman Mao Zedong. The title "chairman" was abandoned after Mao's death, and the head of the party is now called the "general secretary." The party has a separate constitution from the government's Constitution of 1982, and its central bodies are:

- **National Party Congress** – This body consists of more than 2000 delegates chosen primarily from congresses on lower levels. It only meets every five years, so it is obviously not important in policy-making. It usually rubberstamps decisions made by the party leaders, although in recent years it has

acted somewhat more independently. Its main importance remains its power to elect members of the Central Committee.

- **Central Committee** – The Committee has about 340 members (some of whom are alternates) that meet together annually for about a week. They carry on the business of the National Party Congress between sessions, although their size and infrequent meetings limit their policymaking powers. Their meetings are called **plenums**, and they are important in that they are gatherings of the political elites, and from their midst are chosen the Politburo and the Standing Committee.
- **Politburo/Standing Committee** – These most powerful political organizations are at the very top of the CCP structure. They are chosen by the Central Committee, and their decisions dictate government policies. The Politburo has 24 members and the Standing Committee – chosen from the Politburo membership – has only 7. They meet in secret, and their membership reflects the balance of power among factions and the relative influence of different groups in policymaking.

NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES

Even though China effectively has a one-party system, the CCP does allow the existence of eight “democratic” parties. Each party has a special group that it draws from, such as intellectuals or businessmen. Their total membership is about a half million, and they are tightly controlled by the CCP. They do not contest the CCP for control of the government, but they do serve an important advisory role to the party leaders. Some members even attain high government positions, but organizationally these parties serve only as a loyal non-opposition. Attempts to establish independent democratic parties outside CCP control have been squashed, with the party doling out severe prison sentences to the independent-minded leaders.

ELECTIONS

The PRC holds elections in order to legitimize the government and the CCP. The party controls the commissions that run elections, and it reviews draft lists of proposed candidates to weed out those it finds politically objectionable. The only direct elections are held at the local level, with voters choosing deputies to serve on the county people’s congresses. The people’s congresses at higher levels are selected from and by the lower levels, not directly by the people. Since the 1980s the party has allowed more than one candidate to run for county positions, and most candidates are nominated by the people. One move toward democracy has occurred at the village level, where local officials are no longer appointed from above, but are chosen in direct, secret ballot elections.

THE POLITICAL ELITE

Mao Zedong’s place in Chinese history was sealed by the Long March of 1934-36. He emerged from the ordeal as a charismatic leader who brought about great change. His compatriots that made the journey with him became known as the “Old Guard,” a group of friends that networked with one another for many years through *guanxi*, or personal connections. These personal connections are still the glue that holds Chinese politics together today.

China, like the USSR, recruits its leaders through *nomenklatura*, a system of choosing cadres from lower levels of the party hierarchy for advancement based on their loyalty and contributions to the well-being of the party. However, Chinese leaders communicate with one another through a **patron-client network** called *guanxi*. These linkages are similar to “good old boys networks” in the West, and they underscore the importance of personal career ties between individuals as they rise in bureaucratic or political structures. Besides bureaucratic and personal ties, *guanxi* is based on ideology differences and similarities, and as a result, has

been the source of factions within the party. *Guanxi* is also pervasive at the local level, where ordinary people link up with village leaders and lower party officials.

FACTIONALISM

Factionalism in the years before Mao's death in 1976 is demonstrated in the splits among the radicals (led by Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four), the military under Lin Biao, and the reformers under Zhou Enlai. All three men (Mao, Lin, and Zhou) were part of the "Old Guard" that went on the Long March in the 1930s, but by 1976, all were dead. Deng Xiaoping emerged as the new leader of China, partly because he was able to unite the factions in a course toward economic reform.

Even before Deng's death in 1997, however, factional strife was apparent within the leadership, most notably during the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. In general, the factions have split in at least three ways:

- **Conservatives** – Although all factions supported economic reform, conservatives worry that perhaps the power of the party and the central government has eroded too much. They are particularly concerned about any movement toward democracy and generally support crackdowns on organizations and individuals who act too independently. Their most prominent leader has been **Li Peng**, the former premier and chair of the National People's Congress. His retirement in 2003 leaves the leadership of this faction in doubt.
- **Reformers/open door** – This faction supports major capitalist infusion into the PRC's economy and generally promotes an open door trade policy. These leaders have pushed for membership in the World Trade Organization and have courted the U.S. to grant "most-favored trading" status to China. They don't necessarily support democratic reform, but their focus is on economic growth and development, so their political attitudes tend to be pragmatic. Two important leaders of the reformers were **Jiang Zemin** – the PRC President and CCP General Secretary until 2003 – and Zhu Rongji – the former governor of the central bank and the PRC Premier until 2003. The current president, **Hu Jintao**, and prime minister, **Wen Jiabao**, have allied with this faction.
- **Liberals** – This faction has been out of power since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, but they are generally more accepting of political liberties and democratic movements than are the other factions. They support economic and political reform. The two most famous leaders of this faction are **Hu Yuobang** – whose death started the protests in 1989 – and **Zhao Ziyang** – the Premier and General Secretary who was ousted for being too sympathetic with the Tiananmen protestors. Hu Yobang was the mentor of China's current president, Hu Jintao, but so far he has shown no support for democratic movements.

The factions follow the process of *fang-shou* – a tightening up, loosening up cycle – a waxing and waning of the power of each. In some ways, the cycle is similar to the old dynastic cycle, when ruling families were challenged when they lost the mandate of heaven. Part of the current dominance of the reformers has to do with the lingering influence of Deng Xiaoping, who designated before his death in 1997 that Jiang Zemin would be the "3rd generation" (after Mao and Deng) leader, and Hu Jintao would be the "4th generation" leader.

CORRUPTION

The combination of *guanxi* and the economic boom of the past twenty years have brought about rampant corruption within the Chinese economic and political system. Bribes are common, and corruption is widely regarded as a major problem. President Jiang Zemin acknowledged in 1997, "The fight against corruption is a grave political struggle vital to the very existence of the party and the state...If corruption cannot be

punished effectively, our Party will lose the support and confidence of the people.” In 2004 the Communist Party’s Central Committee published a policy paper that warned its members that corruption and incompetence could threaten its hold on power. The anti-corruption statement bears the mark of President Hu Jintao, who has responded to popular perception of widespread corruption among party members. Under his watch, thousands of officials have recently been punished for corruption, although the problem continues to plague the regime.

In 2007 the Chinese government was embarrassed by international publicity about tainted food, health products, and drugs that were making their way through the world market. In reaction, the head of Beijing’s most powerful food and drug regulating agency was arrested, imprisoned, and eventually executed. In his confession he acknowledged that he had accepted gifts and bribes valued at more than \$850,000 from eight drug companies that sought special favors. Because the Chinese media hardly ever reports corruption cases without official approval, many speculated that this arrest was meant to be a warning from the government. In another case, the press did not report the arrest of the deputy head of a state-run lottery in 2006 for several months. An audit in 2005 found that the lottery had diverted about \$72 million from lottery funds, with a good chunk of it ending up as bonuses for agency staff. Despite these attempts to curtail corruption, the practice of bribing government officials – by both other government officials and private businessmen – is so widespread that luxury goods producers have come to count on it as an increasingly important revenue source. Still, the government’s response is to condemn corruption, and when asked whether such gift-giving takes place, Chinese officials offer strong denials.

INTEREST GROUPS

Organized interest groups and social movements are not permitted to influence the political process unless they are under the party-state authority. The party-state tries to preempt the formation of independent groups by forming mass organizations in which people may express their points of view within strict limits. These mass organizations often form around occupations or social categories. For example, most factory workers belong to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and women’s interests are represented in the All-China Women’s Federation. In urban areas, the party maintains social control through *danwei* – social units usually based on a person’s place of work. People depend on the units for their jobs, income, and promotion, but also for medical care, housing, daycare centers, and recreational facilities.

Despite the ever-present control of the state, in the last 15 years China has gone from having virtually no independent groups of any kind to more than 300,000 nongovernmental organizations, by official count. But that understates the true number. Counting unregistered groups, some estimates place the number as high as two million. Still, their impact on the policymaking process is not clearly felt. For example, in 2007 China’s legislature passed a new labor law to protect workers, requiring employers to provide written contracts and restricting the use of temporary laborers to help give more employees long-term job security. However, the law also enhanced the power of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, a monopoly union for the Communist Party. It is an official state organization charged with overseeing workers, and it alone was given the power to collectively bargain for wages and benefits. Workers are not allowed to form independent unions. It is important to note that no legitimate organizational channel exists for farmers. As a result Chinese farmers are more likely than are most other citizens to express their concerns to the government through petitions and protests.

These organizations and the state’s relationship with them reflect **state corporatism** (p. 37), as well as the logic of Lenin’s democratic centralism. Most organizations are created, or at least approved, by the state, and many have government officials as their leaders. In yet another demonstration of corporatism, the state only allows one organization for any given profession or activity. In cases where two groups with similar interests

exist in a community, local officials will force them to merge or will disband one in favor of the other. This practice prevents competition between the associations and limits how many associations are allowed to exist, making it easier for the state to monitor and control them.

MEDIA

From 1949 until the 1980s, almost all media – television, newspapers, radio, and magazines – were state-run. Since then some independent media has emerged, but state-run media outlets still hold the largest share of the market. The official press agency of the government, **Xinhua**, is huge, employing more than 10,000 people, who are stationed not only in China but abroad as well. Independent newspapers depend on Xinhua for many of their stories. The People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the CCP, also depends on Xinhua for much of its information. Chinese Central Television, or CCTV, is the major state television broadcaster, and it broadcasts a variety of programs to more than one billion people. The internet is also used by many people, with internet cafes popular in most urban areas. However, all media outlets are subject to heavy censorship by the government, which has several regulatory agencies that constantly monitor for subjects that are considered taboo by the government. Despite this censorship, Chinese media has become increasingly commercialized as economic liberalization has taken place, resulting in growing competition, a wider diversity of content, and an increase in investigative reporting.

INSTITUTIONS

The political structure of the People's Republic of China can best be seen as three **parallel hierarchies** that are separate yet interact with one another:

- The **Communist Party**
- The **state or government**
- The **People's Liberation Army**

The party dominates the three yet the organizations are separate. The relationship between the party and the government is controlled by the principle of **dual role** – *vertical* supervision of the next higher level of government and *horizontal* supervision of the Communist Party at the same level.

The organization of party and state are similar on paper to those of the former U.S.S.R., largely because the PRC's structure was designed by the Soviets during the period between 1949 and 1958. In reality, China's policymaking is governed more directly by factions and personal relationships.


THE STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT

The government structure of the People's Republic of China has three branches – a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary. But all branches are controlled by the party, so they are not independent, nor does a system of checks and balances exist. All top government positions are held by party members, as are many on the lower levels.

The People's Congresses

Government authority is formally vested in a system of people's congresses, which begins with a **People's National Congress** at the top and continues in hierarchical levels down through the provincial, city, and local congresses. Theoretically they are the people's legislatures, but in reality they are subject to party authority. The National People's Congress chooses the president and vice president of China, but there is only one

PARALLEL HIERARCHIES IN CHINA



Parallel Hierarchies. The chart illustrates some important relationships between military, party and government structures in China. Parallel hierarchy involves both vertical supervision and horizontal supervision.

party-sponsored candidate for each position. Although the Congress itself has little power, its meetings are important to watch because the Politburo's decisions are formally announced then. For example, during the 10th National People's Congress in 2003, China's new president and general secretary (**Hu Jintao**) and chief of Parliament (Wu Bangguo) were announced. Although their appointments were widely known before the meeting began (partly because their leadership had been announced at the 2002 CCP meeting), the PNC meeting was the chosen format for introducing the new leaders to the world.

Executive/Bureaucracy

The **president** and **vice president** serve five-year terms, are limited to two terms, and must be at least 45 years old. The positions are largely ceremonial, though senior party leaders have always held them. In 2003, President Jiang Zemin complied with the Constitution, and stepped down after two terms as president. His action also confirmed the Constitution's requirement for officials to comply with a mandatory retirement age. Currently, Hu Jintao is both the president and the general secretary of the CCP.

The **premier** is the head of government, formally appointed by the president, but again, the position is always held by a member of the Standing Committee. Zhu Rongji held this position from 1998 to 2003, and the current premier is Wen Jiabao. He directs the State Council, which is composed of ministers who direct the many ministries and commissions of the bureaucracy. These are controlled by the principle of **dual role** – supervision from higher bodies in the government and by comparable bodies in the CCP.

The bureaucracy exists on all levels – national, provincial, county, and local. These lower level positions are held by **cadres**, people in positions of authority who are paid by the government or party. Many are both government officials and party members, but not all. In all, about 30 million cadres around China see that the leaders' policies are carried out everywhere.

The Judiciary

China has a four-tiered “**people's court**” system, organized hierarchically just as the people's congresses are. A nationwide organization called the “**people's procuratorate**” provides public prosecutors and defenders to the courts.

Except for a brief period during the 1950s, **rule of law** had little place under Mao, but after 1978 Chinese leaders began to develop new legal ideas and institutions that included this important concept. The Chinese political system now acknowledges rule of law, and interprets it to mean that laws bind behavior and all are equally subject to them. Even though the judicial system does not always apply these principles, it is important that rule of law has been established in the People's Republic of China.

The criminal justice system works swiftly and harshly, with a conviction rate of more than 99% of all cases that come to trial. Prison terms are long and subject to only cursory appeal. Hundreds, perhaps thousands of people have been executed during periods of government-sponsored anti-crimes campaigns. Human rights organizations criticize China for its extensive use of the death penalty.

THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA)

“Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”

Mao Zedong

The military grew hand in hand with communism, as Mao's famous statement reflects. The People's Liberation Army encompasses all of the country's ground, air, and naval armed services. Although plans for a cutback were announced in 1998, the army is huge, with about 3 million active personnel and about 12 million reserves. Yet in proportion to its population, the Chinese military presence is smaller than that of the United States. China has about 2.4 military personnel for every 1000 people, whereas the U.S. has 6.1. Military spending is only about 4% of that of the U.S., although some analysts suspect that the government underestimates the military budget. Despite these statistics, China's military budget has been growing at double-digit rates for years, with an estimated 18% rise for 2007. In early 2007 a missile was sent into space to destroy an old weather satellite, indicating the growing military sophistication of the PLA.

The military has never held formal political power in the People's Republic of China, but it has been an important influence on politics and policy. All of the early political leaders were also military leaders. For example, Mao and the other members of the “Old Guard”, led the Long March of the 1930s primarily by military moves.

The second half of Mao's famous quote above is less often quoted:

“Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party.”

Clearly, the military has never threatened to dominate the party. It is represented in the government by the Central Military Commission, which has been led by many prominent party leaders, including Deng Xiaoping.

The Tiananmen crisis in 1989 greatly harmed the image of the PLA, since the military was ordered to recapture the square and do so with brutal force. But the PLA continues to play an important role in Chinese politics. Two of the 24 members of the Politburo are military officers, and PLA representatives make up over 20 percent of the Central Committee membership. In 2003, **Jiang Zemin's** retention of his position as head of the Central Military Commission despite his stepping down as president, indicates that he still had significant policymaking power. When President Hu Jintao replaced Jiang in 2004, the shift signaled that the transition of power was complete, and that Hu now has full control of the parallel hierarchies.

POLICYMAKING AND POLITICAL ISSUES

Since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's rule in 1979, policymaking in China has centered on reconciling centralized political authority with marketization and privatization of the economy. Many political scientists who have assumed that democracy and capitalism always accompany one another have waited for China to democratize, an event that has yet to occur. After all, that pattern occurred in the countries that industrialized first, and the fall of the Soviet Union confirmed the notion that authoritarian states cannot be capitalistic. China has defied these theorists, and has found its own path to economic prosperity.

POLICYMAKING PROCESS: *FANG-SHOU*

Deng Xiaoping's carefully balanced blend of socialist central planning with a capitalist market economy has not been without its critics. The tensions within the system – both economic and political – are evidenced in *fang-shou*, a letting-go, tightening-up cycle evidenced even under Mao in his reaction to the Hundred Flowers Movement. The cycle consists of three types of actions/policies – economic reform, political movements (letting go), and a tightening-up by the CCP. With each new reform that reflects economic liberalization, liberal factions react with a demand for political liberalization, which the Party responds to with force. The cycle is characterized by a lack of transparency, with policymakers meeting behind closed doors and only revealing their plans when the government takes action.

POLICY ISSUES


Policy issues are numerous, but they may be put into four categories: democracy and human rights issues, population issues economic issues, and foreign policy and international trade issues.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The Chinese leaders that came to power after Deng's death in 1997 have not strayed significantly from Deng's path of economic reform and resistance to political reform. Jiang Zemin was the General Secretary of the CCP from 1989-2003 and the President from 1993 to 2003, but he did not consolidate his power until after Deng's death in 1997. Zhu Rongji – Premier from 1998 to 2003 and former governor of the central bank – also emerged as an influential leader. Jiang was often criticized for being a weak leader and did not have the same stature as Deng or Mao – the two men who dominated China during the second half of the 20th century. Hu Jintao, leader since 2003, for the most part has also held to the path defined by Deng.

Despite the continuing tensions between economic and political policy, some democratic reforms can be seen in these ways:

- Some input from the National People's Congress is accepted by the Politburo.
- More emphasis is placed on laws and legal procedures.
- Village elections are now semi-competitive, with choices of candidates and some freedom from the party's control.



Tensions in China's political economy. The process of *fang-shou* gives some insight into how the Chinese government has managed the tensions between capitalism and democracy. The two rounds of economic reform shown (The Four Modernizations and the Second Revolution) were each followed by political movements that were repressed by the government. Since 1989, the economic reforms have been incremental yet significant, but the government's response to political movements has remained constant.

The Tiananmen Crisis began as a grief demonstration for the death of Hu Yaobang – a liberal who had earlier resigned from the Politburo under pressure from the conservatives. Most of the original demonstrators were students and intellectuals, but other groups joined them, and the wake turned into democratic protests. They criticized corruption and demanded democratic reforms, and hundreds of thousands joined in. Protests erupted all over China, and Tiananmen became the center of international attention for almost two months. How would the Politburo react?

The answer came with guns, as Deng sent the People's Liberation Army to shut down the protests, using whatever means necessary. The army shot its way to the square, killing hundreds of protesting citizens. They recaptured control, but the fatalities and arrests began a broad new wave of international protests from human rights advocates. Unofficial estimates of fatalities range from 700 to several thousand.

Since then, China has been under a great deal of pressure from international human rights organizations to democratize their political process and to abide by human rights standards advocated by the groups. Deng Xiaoping showed little impulse to liberalize the political process, as did the government that followed under Jiang Zemin, at least publicly. Factional disagreements are kept from the public eye, yet all evidence indicates that Hu Jintao is following the same path.

The Rule of Law

The principle of **rule of law**, almost always associated with liberal democracies, is based on the belief that rulers should not have absolute power over their subjects, and that their actions should be constrained by the same principles that control ordinary citizens. From the communist point of view, law is part of politics that the bourgeoisie uses to suppress the proletariat. Communist leaders, then, have never acknowledged rule of law as a legitimate principle. For example, during the Cultural Revolution, in an effort to bring about his dream of a new egalitarian society, Mao Zedong set about to destroy the old legal codes of dynastic China. However, since 1978 legal codes have begun to revive, partly because the new economic growth and investments have required that consistent regulations be in place that allow China to trade internationally and attract foreign companies.

Criminal law, almost nonexistent in 1978, has also developed because of the new opportunities for bribery, theft, and inside stock market trading created by the economic boom. As a result, **procuratorates**, officials who investigate and prosecute official crimes, were recreated from earlier days, and they have played a role in Hu Jintao's crackdown on corruption within the Communist Party. The 1982 Constitution, theoretically at least, commits the party to the authority of law. Today the Chinese state is more constrained by law and Chinese citizens freer by law from political whim than ever before. However, this trend does not change the fact that Chinese justice is harsh by the standards of most other nations, and the death penalty is often enforced for smuggling, rape, theft, bribery, trafficking in women and children, and official corruption. It is also true that no independent judiciary has ever existed in the People's Republic of China, but remains under the tight control of the CCP.

Civil Rights and Liberties

Since the protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989, the status of civil rights and liberties in China has been widely debated. Many people believed that because Hu Jintao was mentored by Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang (leaders of the liberal faction), that he would promote more individual freedoms in China. For example, Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao took the lead in reversing the party's cover-up of the deadly SARS outbreak, pledging greater accountability and transparency in government. However, Hu has shown few signs of changing the government's basic political policies toward individual civil liberties and rights. For example, he has adopted new measures to regulate discussions on university internet sites. Several dissident

writers who have criticized the government have been arrested, and a professor who posted highly critical comments of the government on the internet was dismissed from Beijing University. Hu has also called for “ideological education” in universities, a phrase that is reminiscent of the Maoist era.

POPULATION POLICY

In 1965 Chinese leader Mao Zedong announced that an ever-expanding population is a “good thing,” and in 1974 he denounced population policies as “imperialist tools” designed to weaken developing countries. At the time of Mao’s death in 1976, China had about 850 million people with a birth rate of 25. His successors recognized that population growth was consuming more than half of the annual increase in the country’s gross domestic product, so China introduced a campaign advocating the “two-child family.” The government provided services – including abortions – that supported the program, resulting in a drop in China’s birth rate to 19.5 by the late 1970s. In 1979 China’s new leader, Deng Xiaoping, went even further by instituting the “**one child policy**.” This program included both incentives and penalties to assure that couples produced only one child. Late marriages were encouraged, and free contraceptives, abortions, and sterilizations were provided to families that followed the policy. Penalties, including steep fines, were imposed on couples that had a second child. In 1984 the policy was relaxed in rural areas, where children’s labor was still important, but it was reinstated in 2002 in reaction to reports that many rural births were not being reported to the government. In contrast, Chinese people in cities were generally more accepting of the one-child policy since it better suited urban life styles and needs. By 1986 the birth rate had fallen to 18, a figure far below those in other less developed countries.

However, the policy has had other consequences. One is a rise in female infanticide, or the killing of baby girls. Because traditional Chinese society has always valued males above females, many couples have wanted their one child to be a boy. If a girl is born instead, some have chosen to end the child’s life so that they can try again to have a boy. The incidence of female infanticide is almost impossible to tally, but the practice has led to a disproportionate number of male to female children. Over the years China’s population pyramid has developed a lopsided number of young adult males to young adult females. The problem is so serious that many young men are unable to find women to marry. Some projections suggest that by the mid-21st century China’s population numbers will start falling. If that occurs, it almost certainly will change the cultural tradition of sons taking care of their aging parents. There could be too few sons to carry out the responsibility, leaving China with a problem of what to do about a growing number of elderly people with no one to take care of them.

ECONOMIC POLICY

From 1949 to 1978, China followed a communist political economic model: a command economy directed by a central government based on democratic centralism. Mao Zedong called this policy the “**iron rice bowl**,” or cradle-to-grave health care, work, and retirement security. The state set production quotas and distributed basic goods to consumers. When this model failed, Deng Xiaoping began a series of economic reforms that make up the **socialist market economy** – gradual infusion of capitalism while still retaining state control.

Agricultural policy

- **The people’s communes** – During the early days of the PRC – in an effort to realize important socialist goals – virtually all peasants were organized into collective farms of approximately 250 families each. During the Great Leap Forward, farms were merged into gigantic **people’s communes** with several thousand families. These communes were one of the weakest links in Mao’s China, with

production and rural living standards showing little improvement between 1957 and 1977. Many communes were poorly managed, and peasants often didn't see the need to work hard, contrary to Mao's hopes of developing devotion through the mass line.

- **Household responsibility system** – In the early 1980s, Deng dismantled the communes and replaced them with a **household responsibility system**, which is still in effect today. In this system individual families take full charge of the production and marketing of crops. After paying government taxes and contract fees to the villages, families may consume or sell what they produce. Food production improved dramatically, and villages developed both private farming and industry.

“Private Business”

In 1988 the National People's Congress officially created a new category of “**private business**” under the control of the party. It included urban co-ops, service organizations, and rural industries that largely operate as capitalist enterprises. The importance of China's state sector has gradually diminished, although private industry remains heavily regulated by the government. Price controls have been lifted, and private businesses have grown by leaps and bounds since the 1980s, and are far more profitable and dynamic than are the state-owned ones.

The fastest growing sector of the Chinese economy is rooted in **township and village enterprises (TVEs)**, rural factories and businesses that vary greatly in size, and are run by local government and private entrepreneurs. Although they are called collective enterprises, they make their own decisions and are responsible for their profits and losses. The growth of the TVE system has slowed the migration of peasants to the cities, and has become the backbone of economic strength in the countryside.

Economic Problems

The reforms have brought several important economic problems:

- **Unemployment and inequality** – Under Maoism, everyone was guaranteed a job, but marketization has brought very high rates of unemployment to China today. The Chinese leadership hopes that the booming economy will eventually take care of the unemployed, once the economy has had time to adjust to the reforms. Economic growth has also made some people very rich, and has barely affected others. As a result, economic inequality has increased significantly. The growing inequality has created a **floating population** of rural migrants seeking job opportunities in cities. As cities grow larger, crime rates have increased and infrastructures are strained, leaving urban residents with the tendency to blame the new migrants for their problems.
- **Inefficiency of the state sector** – Over the years the state-owned sector of the economy has gradually declined so that today almost three-fourths of industrial production is privately owned. The state sector is still large, however, and it is plagued by corruption, inefficiency, and too many workers. Without state subsidies these industries would almost surely fail, bringing about even higher unemployment rates, so the government has continued to support them.
- **Pollution** – As China has industrialized, air and water pollution have become increasingly serious problems. Beijing and Shanghai have some of the most polluted air in the world, and sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emitted by China's coal-fired power plants fall as acid rain on the neighboring countries of South Korea and Japan. Experts once thought China would overtake the United States as the world's leading producer of greenhouse gases by 2010, but now the International Energy Agency believes that probably happened before 2008. The issue is a real dilemma for the govern-

ment because China is still a poor country in many ways, and to reduce industrial output could ruin the economic progress of the past few decades. However, evidence that China's air and water are unhealthy for the population is mounting. The government has set targets for energy efficiency and improved air and water quality, but so far they have gone unmet. So far, the Communist Party has done little to build a bureaucracy with the clout to enforce environmental edicts and monitor pollution. One hopeful sign is that the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) has been upgraded to a ministry position, and so state coordination of environmental policy may improve. On January 1, 2009, a new law took effect requiring industries to cut water consumption, use more clean energy, and recycle waste.

- **Product safety** – In 2007 Chinese factories were caught exporting poisonous pharmaceutical ingredients, bogus pet food, faulty tires, and unhealthy shellfish. An international outcry followed, and the government has been pressured to do something about it. A big part of the problem lies with the tension between central government authority and capitalism. In order to allow the market economy to grow, authority has been decentralized, so that local officials have gained a great deal of decision-making power. As a result, the central government has lost direct control over production, and some faulty products have made their way into the international market.

When the global economic crisis occurred in September 2008, many observers believed that China's economy would suffer more than most, especially since its prosperity was solidly based on exports to western nations, especially the United States. Since many Chinese products were sold to Americans, the decline in American consumption struck at the heart of the Chinese economy, with the country's GDP dropping sharply during the last months of 2008. However, China and many other Asian nations rebounded impressively in 2009, and most economists predicted that its economy would expand by more than 6% by the end of the year. Although this increase in GDP is smaller than increases in recent years, it is still far better than the figures for most western nations, with forecasters predicting continued economic contractions for them. This economic recovery led many to believe that China's economy was less dependent on American consumers than they had previously thought.

One reason for the apparent recovery in 2009 was that the Chinese government quickly passed a large stimulus bill that poured money into the economy, an act of **pump-priming** based on Keynesian economic theory that a faltering capitalistic economy can be rescued by government spending. Because most Asian consumers are much less debt-burdened than their American counterparts, they are more likely to spend cash handouts, thus contributing to economic recovery.

FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Since 1998 Chinese foreign policy has undergone profound changes that have brought the country closer into the mainstream of international politics. China still resists pressure from other countries to improve its human rights record, and Chinese leaders continue to threaten to invade Taiwan now and again. However, especially in the areas of trade, China has integrated into the world community in almost unprecedented ways. It is quickly replacing Japan as the most powerful economy in Asia, and is now Asia's central economy that affects all others. Chinese-Japanese relations have been problematic since the late 19th century when Japan began to rise as a world power, generally at China's expense. Both countries are particularly sensitive about Japan's invasion of China during World War II, and formal relations were called off for several months in 2006 because the Japanese prime minister visited a controversial war memorial. Now the two countries are on speaking terms again, but tensions still remain. China also has trading partners all over the world, and that trade is an integral part of the growing economy.

Foreign Policy Under Mao

Until Mao's death in 1976, the PRC based its foreign policy on providing support for third world revolutionary movements. It provided substantial development assistance to a handful of the most radical states. Examples are Korea and Vietnam. Under Mao, China's relationship with the USSR changed dramatically in the late 1950s from one of dependence to independence.

During the 1920s and 1950s, the USSR gave large amounts of money, as well as technical and political advice to China. The countries broke into rivalry during the late 1950s when Mao decided that the Soviets had turned their backs on Marx and revolution. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution affirmed China's independent path from Moscow's control.

US/Chinese Relations

The chill in China/Soviet relationships encouraged the U.S. to eye the advantages of opening positive interactions with China. As long as Mao was in control, his anti-capitalist attitudes – as well as U.S. containment policy – meant that the countries had no contacts until the early 1970s. Then, with Mao sick and weak, reformist Zhou Enlai opened the door to western contact. President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger engineered negotiations, and Nixon's famous 1972 visit to China signaled a new era. Relations opened with a ping-pong match between the two countries, but after Deng Xiaoping's leadership began in 1978, his open door policy helped lead the way to more substantial contact. Today the U.S. imports many more products from China than it exports, and is concerned about the imbalance between exports and imports. The U.S. has pressured China to devalue their currency and to crack down on illegal exports, but so far, China has resisted the currency adjustment, and the illegal exports continue to be a problem.

One change in recent years is that China's prime minister, Wen Jiabao, no longer refers to China as one of many countries involved in world trade, but has begun to refer to China as a great power. The official line is no longer that China is a country that focuses primarily on internal development, and the country's international ambitions are more openly revealed. After the United States took a tremendous hit in the global financial crisis of September 2008, Mr. Wen announced that he was concerned about China's holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds and other debt, and that China was watching economic developments in the United States closely. The message was sent as one equal country to another, a far cry from previous exchanges in which U.S. officials lectured Chinese officials about undervaluing Chinese currency. In the G-20 summit meeting in Britain in April 2009, China took a central participating role and suggested that the economic crisis could best be addressed by a "G-2" meeting between the United States and China.

International Trade and Business Today

Another integral part of the economic reform of the past quarter century has been the opening of the Chinese economy to international forces. Four **Special Economic Zones (SEZs)** were established in 1979. In these regions, foreign investors were given preferential tax rates and other incentives. Five years later fourteen more areas became SEZs, and today foreign investments and free market mechanisms have spread to most of the rest of urban China.

Since 1978 China's trade and industry have expanded widely. With this expansion has come a rapidly growing GDP, entrepreneurship, and trade with many nations. A wealthy class of businessmen has emerged, and Chinese products have made their way around the world. China is now a member of the World Trade Organization, and it also has "most favored nation status" for trading with the U.S. A monumental recognition of China's new economic power came in 1997, when the British officially "gave" the major trading city of Hong Kong back to Chinese control.

Deng Xiaoping emphasized economic reform, but he continued to believe that the Party should be firmly in command of the country. In general, he did not support political reforms that included democracy and/or more civil liberties for citizens. Freedoms and incentives were granted to entrepreneurs, but they have operated largely under the patron-client system (*guanxi*).

Hong Kong

In 1997 the British ceded control of Hong Kong to mainland China under a “**one country, two systems**” agreement signed by Britain and China in 1984. Under this policy, Hong Kong is subject to Chinese rule, but continues to enjoy “a high degree of autonomy,” meaning that it maintains its capitalist system, legal system, and ways of life. Since the handover, Beijing authorities have been less heavy-handed than feared, and Hong Kong today enjoys the same civil liberties as under British rule. Even though many Hong Kongers fear that the situation might change, their city is still one where people can openly talk politics, speak against the government, and choose a legislature in multi-party elections.

Some problems surfaced in 2003 when Tung Chee-hwa, chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administration region, spearheaded a move to sell government-owned public housing and business properties without consultation with the partially elected legislature. The incident spilled over into a half a million people marching the streets to protest Beijing’s lack of movement toward wider popular representation and an elected governor. Hu chastised Tung for his actions, and even though tensions still remain, no protests have reemerged on the same scale as those in 2003. Hong Kong’s international trade was seriously impacted by the global economic crisis of late 2008, and its GDP shrank by 7.8% in the first quarter of 2009. To add to the city’s economic woes in 2009, the Chinese government approved a plan to turn Shanghai into a global financial and shipping center by 2020, presenting competition to Hong Kong as the international star of the region. However, Hong Kong’s elite remains staunchly pro-business, and the Chinese government has supported the city’s economic development, and so its future as a leading international trading center is most likely secure.

Taiwan

The island of Taiwan was the destination of Chiang Kai-shek after being driven from mainland China by Mao Zedong in 1949. Since post World War II, Taiwan has claimed to be the Republic of China, separate from the People’s Republic of China ruled by the Communist Party. Taiwan’s autonomy was protected by the United States in a Cold War tactic against Communist China, and until the 1970s, Taiwan was recognized by western nations as the sole legitimate representative of China. However, in 1971, Taiwan lost its membership in the United Nations and its seat on the Security Council to the People’s Republic of China, and in 1979, the United States recognized mainland China diplomatically. Today only a few countries recognize Taiwan’s sovereignty.

In recent years, the Chinese government has made its claim to Taiwan clear. Chinese leaders assert the belief that Taiwan is historically and legitimately a part of China and should be returned to its control. The Taiwanese government does not agree, but political parties in Taiwan are split in their attitudes about how to respond to China’s claims. One point of view is that Taiwan should stand up to, or even defy China, but an opposite sentiment is that Taiwan should try to reconcile its differences with its giant neighbor. The fact that China is Taiwan’s biggest trade partner has encouraged the Taiwanese leadership to explore the possibility of bringing the island closer to the mainland. An important change came recently when regular crossings across the Taiwan Strait began for aircraft and mail. Weekend charter flights began in July 2008, and weekday services were added by the end of the year. These changes now allow for more regular communication between the island and the mainland and almost certainly will ease trade and business exchanges as well.

Will China continue to expand its international contacts and its free market economy? If so, will tensions increase between economic and political sectors of the country? During the 20th century many countries have struggled to define the relationship between free market economies and political leadership styles. Most obviously, the Soviet Union collapsed rather than reconcile market liberalization with centralized political power. Will the same thing happen to China, or will its policy of introducing market principles gradually work out in the end? This challenge and many more await answers from Hu Jintao and his leadership team.

IMPORTANT TERMS AND CONCEPTS

“3rd generation leader”, “4th generation leader”

autonomous regions

cadres

Central Committee

Central Military Commission

Chiang Kai-shek

collectivism

Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

Confucianism

Cultural Revolution

danwei

decentralization

democratic centralism

Deng Xiaoping Theory

dual role

dynastic cycles

egalitarianism

ethic of struggle

factions, factionalism

fang-shou

floating population

foreign devils”

Four Modernization

free market socialism

“Gang of Four”

guanxi

Great Leap Forward

Han Chinese

hegemony

household responsibility system

Hu Jintao

Hu Yaobang

iron rice bowl

Jiang Zemin

Li Peng

Long March

mandate of heaven

Mao Zedong
Maoism
mass line
mass mobilization
“Middle Kingdom” (*zhongguo*)
Nationalist Party (Goumindang)
National Party Congress
“a new socialist countryside”
nomenklatura
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
one-child policy
“one country, two systems”
parallel hierarchies
patron client system in China
People’s Courts, procuratorate
People’s Liberation Army
People’s National Congress
plenums
Politburo/Standing Committee
political elites
“private business”
rule of law and China
self-reliance
socialist market economy
Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
state corporatism
Sun Yat-sen
technocrats
township and village enterprises (TVEs)
“Two Chinas”
unstinting service
Wen Jiabao
Youth League
Zhao Ziyang